Shadow Warfare: The History of America's Undeclared Wars
Larry Hancock, Stuart Wexler
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Shadow Warfare traces the evolution of these covert operations, detailing the tactics and tools used from the Truman era through those of the contemporary Obama Administrations. It also explores the personalities and careers of many of the most noted shadow warriors of the past sixty years, tracing the decade-long relationship between the CIA and the military.
Shadow Warfare presents a balanced, non-polemic exploration of American secret warfare, detailing its patterns, consequences and collateral damage and presenting its successes as well as failures. Shadow Wars explores why every president from Franklin Roosevelt on, felt compelled to turn to secret, deniable military action. It also delves into the political dynamic of the president’s relationship with Congress and the fact that despite decades of combat, the U.S. Congress has chosen not to exercise its responsibility to declare a single state of war - even for extended and highly visible combat.
contacts, or anything else your information can conjure which will permit you to press forward toward our [deleted] objective in a secure manner.”474 In the end, there were officially no further CIA contacts with the military, and General Schneider was murdered. The act occurred “at a distance,” with no direct involvement of CIA officers or use of provided weapons. Later, when the assassination was investigated by a Senate committee, the CIA officers were essentially presented as acting in a
combination of political caution, strongly demanded deniability, and essentially always being sent late to the battle. Overall the use of SOG in Vietnam reflects poorly on the tendency of President Johnson, Defense Secretary McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk towards micromanagement of combat operations. It also strayed far from President Kennedy’s original low-intensity, surgical Special Forces concept—but then Kennedy’s concept was to have them involved in cooperative defense efforts
civilian casualties. The most recent available studies estimate between twenty-five hundred and thirty-five hundred people killed there since 2004. Somewhere between 1,487 and 2,595 were reported as militants, leaving a civilian casualty rate of 20 to 25 percent for the total period. The year 2006 saw the highest percentage of nonmilitant casualties, over 60 percent. The attacks in Pakistan have declined significantly since 2011, when there were some 272 strikes. There were forty-eight in 2012.
Intervention—Reagan’s Wars against the Sandinistas (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987), 202–203. 616Ibid., 198–199. 617Ibid., 199. 618Ibid., 200. 619U.S. Department of Justice, “Previous Investigations Concerning Allegations of Contra Drug Trafficking.” http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9712/ch01p2.htm 620Ibid. 621Peter Kornbluh, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 113, “The Oliver North File: His Diaries, E-Mail, and Memos on the Kerry Report, Contras,
direction for that action remains unclear, even after extensive investigation. Certainly J.C. King had recommended it to Allen Dulles; whether or not Dulles discussed it with Eisenhower is unknown. Given that Dulles had already attempted to carry out the murder of one foreign leader, Patrice Lumumba, at Eisenhower’s direction he may simply have assumed that assassination was an acceptable tactic. What is certain is that Cuba project head Richard Bissell actually initiated the effort and that